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Executive Summary 
 
• A recent debate in Scottish media and business circles has been highly critical of 
the role of the public sector in the Scottish economy. The debate has revolved 
around the extent to which public sector expenditure and investment has ‘crowded 
out’ the private sector, leading to poor national economic performance. 
 
• Drawing upon both established theory and empirical evidence from the UK 
macroeconomy, the paper suggests that there is little evidence over the long term 
of a negative relationship between public spending and private investment. 
 
• At an international level, there is no significant link between countries with high 
economic growth rates over the 1990s and levels of government spending and 
personal taxation. There is a small negative relationship between corporation tax 
rates and economic growth although outliers suggest this is not statistically 
significant.  
 
• Equally significant is the relationship between tax receipts and income equality. 
Countries with higher state involvement generally have lower levels of income 
inequality, suggesting that government intervention remains important in ensuring 
wealth is fairly distributed. 
 
• Claims made about Ireland as a successful example of what we term here a 
‘minimalist state’ economy during the 1990s need to be critically appraised in the 
light of the considerable subsidy that the country has received from the European 
Union over the period in question.   
 
• Claims that Scotland’s public sector has crowded out the private sector in recent 
years are largely unsubstantiated. Other sectors have shown more rapid rates of 
employment growth. Scotland’s public sector employment – at around one quarter 
of total employment – is less than the third claimed by critics. 
 
• Scottish public sector institutions are critical to the success of the Scottish 
economy through providing basic infrastructure as well as key human and 
technological resources for emergent sectors such as biotechnology.  
 
• The report argues for the need to move beyond a simple dichotomy of public 
sector ‘bad’, private sector ‘good’, to develop a more sophisticated understanding 
of how the two inter-relate in successful and balanced economies. 
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Introduction 
 
At a private breakfast meeting with MSPs on 6th October, the chairman of Scottish 
Enterprise, Sir John Ward, allegedly made a comment comparing areas of the Scottish 
economy with the former Soviet Union by suggesting that government spending in 
Ayrshire was at “Eastern bloc” levels (see MacDonnell, 2005; Nelson, 2005; Smith, 
2005). This comment, motivated by research data from Scottish Enterprise comparing 
public and private spending, stimulated a debate in the Scottish media about the role 
of the Scottish public sector in relation to economic growth and the ‘crowding-out’ of 
private investment. An article in Scotland on Sunday (9th October) argued that the 
Scottish public sector was “cash-bloated” and “efficiency-challenged”, alongside 
which it stressed the need to reduce taxes because high rates “depress the private 
sector” as does public sector employment, a position endorsed by Bill Jamieson, 
wrting in the SoS’s sister paper The Scotsman (10th October). A week later Scotland 
on Sunday continued with this theme, presenting a series of possible solutions to the 
perceived effects of too much public spending. These included greater private 
involvement in health and education services. 
 
The production of a critical analysis of Sir John Ward’s claims by Professor Brian 
Ashcroft of the Fraser Allander Institute later in the month added fuel to the debate. In 
his analysis, Ashcroft highlighted several flaws in the Scottish Enterprise figures and 
their presentation. Subsequently Fraser Nelson, writing in The Scotsman (27th 
October), sought to challenge this analysis, continuing to argue that the public sector 
‘occupies’ around three-quarters of the economy in parts of Scotland. In The Herald 
(27th October), Mark Smith highlighted one of the main points of Ashcroft’s 
argument, that the Scottish Enterprise figures ignored “income generated by people 
who live in the area but work elsewhere”. Two weeks later, George Kerevan criticised 
Ashcroft in The Scotsman (9th November) for presenting “contradictory” arguments, 
whilst comparing Scotland unfavorably to Ireland and other small European countries 
such as Estonia where the key to economic success is perceived as a low tax, 
‘minimalist state’ economy.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to critically assess the claims at the heart of this debate 
that increased public sector spending is detrimental to economic growth, and that the 
most dynamic economies are those that have the smallest public sectors. The evidence 
is reviewed in four parts. In the first, we consider both the theoretical and empirical 
arguments for and against the ‘crowding out’ thesis. We then consider some 
international comparative data on the relationship between economic growth and the 
size of public expenditure. This is followed by data exploring the evidence that 
Scotland has in recent years seen a much greater increase in public sector spend 
relative to other parts of the UK. We then draw upon recent research into the role that 
the public sector has played in anchoring key new clusters of economic activity as 
part of a shift towards the knowledge-based economy. 
 
‘Crowding Out’: empirical evidence and theoretical arguments 
 
Crowding out in the context of the UK economy 
 
The general definition of crowding-out is when government spending in an 
equilibrium economy pushes out private investment by producing disincentive effects, 
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such as rising interest rates induced by government borrowing requirements, and 
consuming goods and services produced by the private sector, meaning that the 
private sector has to procure goods and services from an external source (i.e. import) 
(Griffiths and Wall, 2001: p.13-4).  Crowding out arguments were central to the 
analysis of leading Conservative and neoclassical economists in the 1970s in 
explaining the decline of British industry. In particular, industrial decline was 
attributed to the displacement of private industry by the public sector, especially 
through the growth of non-market sectors like health and education.  
 
Evidence for crowding-out effects can be derived from comparing potential with 
actual performance within an economy. If we take the average UK growth rate as the 
potential output that Scotland could achieve then it would appear that Scotland is 
underperforming. The argument that private investment is being crowded-out in 
Scotland is based on evidence of levels of economic growth, namely the lower 
relative performance in GDP growth against the UK average.  
 
Whilst it is true that the Scottish economy has performed below the UK national 
average for a long period, certainly going back to the late 1970s, it would be difficult 
to make the argument that this is due to the crowding out effects of public 
expenditure. Treasury figures for 2005 show that public sector investment has 
declined significantly since the late 1960s. As a proportion of GDP, public investment 
declined from 7.1 % (1967-8) to less than 1 % by the mid 1990s, before rising under 
the current Labour Government to 1.6 % in 2004-5. In contrast, public expenditure 
has fluctuated considerably over the past three decades.  Rising public expenditures in 
the 1970s reflected the particular circumstance of the time: rising oil prices, inflation, 
wage pressures, balance of payments problems and growing unemployment. 
Government expenditure may have contributed to rising inflation and interest rates, 
but was unlikely to be the key factor. Subsequent increases in expenditure during the 
1980s and 1990s, up until 1997, were largely due to the effects of the economic cycle. 
In particular, the recessions of the late 1970s / early 1980s and early 1990s and rising 
unemployment were the main reasons for the rise in the state sector under the 
Thatcher and Major administrations. However, since a peak in the early 1980s, the 
trend over the longer term has been one of decline. Despite the decline in public 
sector investment and expenditure, there has not been a corresponding increase in 
private sector investment, which, as a recent paper by the Institute of Fiscal Studies 
noted, continues to lag behind countries such as Germany, France, the United States 
and Japan  (Bloom and Bond, 2001: p.10).  
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Figure 1: UK Public Sector Expenditure and Investment 1967-8 to 2004-5
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Crowding out since devolution 
 
More recently, it has been argued that the relatively low level of recent GDP growth 
in Scotland, with an average annual rate of around 1.7 % between 2000 and 2003, is a 
direct result of public spending, as public expenditure ‘crowds out’ private spending, 
particularly associated with devolution. As Fraser Nelson noted in The Scotsman (27th 
October) ‘the government employs a third of the workforce, and pays another sixth to 
be either unemployed or claim incapacity benefit. There is less room for companies to 
grow.’ The implication is that government spending somehow has a direct and 
negative effect on private sector investment. 
 
However, there are several problems with this argument, especially in the Scottish 
context. Most importantly, it conflates two very different aspects of possible 
crowding-out effects; (a) the macroeconomic effect on interest rates and investment, 
and (b) the structural effect on employment and firms. It also ignores the ‘crowding-
in’ effects of public expenditure, such as that from education, infrastructure or 
research and development spending.  
 
Responding to these arguments in the most recent Scottish Economic Report 
(December 2005), the Scottish Executive argued that there are several factors that 
need to be accounted for in any discussion. Firstly, government expenditure in 
Scotland is split between devolved and non-devolved budgets, with the devolved 
budget representing 60 % of the total. This means that the Scottish Executive only has 
a partial influence over crowding-out effects. 
 
Second, the expression of “government expenditure as a proportion of GDP does not 
measure the public sector’s share of GDP” (Scottish Executive, 2005: p.77), meaning 
that characterising the dominance of a local economy by the public sector based on 
GDP proportion is misleading. GDP measures value added rather than total economic 
activity.  
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Thirdly, government expenditure consists of two aspects; (a) government services and 
(b) transfer spending. The first of these can be further split between procurement of (i) 
“intermediate” resources such as material for public organisations, and (ii) purchases 
from the private sectors. Government services procurement can therefore contribute to 
the economy and to private sector wealth, whilst transfer spending is a form of 
redistribution of income, rather than an element of crowding-out.  
 
Finally, Scottish Executive policies have no effect on fiscal policy because 
government borrowing is an irrelevant factor in regional economies like Scotland’s as 
is the claim that increased spending necessitate increased taxation. In the Scottish 
context this latter point can be disregarded because Scottish spending “is collected via 
the UK tax system and distributed to the devolved administration in the form of a 
block grant in accordance with the Barnett formula” (ibid.: p.87).  
 
Differentiating public spending from private investment 
 
One important assumption of the crowding-out theory is that the public sector is less 
efficient than the private sector, which therefore means that private sector spending is 
more productive than public sector spending leading to higher  rates of economic 
growth (along with attendant impacts on fiscal policy, interest rates, employment 
motivation etc.) (McGregor and Swales, 2005). In discussing the relationship between 
government spending and GDP growth, Martin Wolf (2003), of the Financial Times, 
has argued that the relationship between high spend and low growth is minimal, if 
existent at all, a finding reiterated by Chris Giles (2005) in his discussion of taxation 
and public expenditure. It is therefore difficult to sustain the claim that the public 
sector is either less productive than the private sector or impacts on economic growth. 
Further evidence for these claims is reviewed in the next section of the paper.  
 
The simplistic analysis behind these arguments is not just that the private sector 
creates wealth and the public sector stifles it, but also that an increase in the public 
sector, in employment, in capital investment and in current expenditure somehow 
crowds out private investment. This idea comes from a very simplistic understanding 
of the relationship between private and public investment. This is based on two rather 
flawed assumptions: firstly, that private sector investment and public sector 
expenditure and investment are substitutable for each other; and, secondly, that the 
level of interest rates affects the rates of private sector investment. If interest rates are 
lowered, private sector investment will increase as the price of borrowing falls. 
Increased public sector investment and capital spending means more demand for 
borrowing, which leads to higher interest rates, which causes a decline in private 
sector investment. A highly flawed assumption here is that public and private 
investment inhabit the same market space and that if demand from the public sector – 
for investment funds – is reduced, this will lead to increased private sector investment 
in the economy as interest rates fall. However, this is not the case. 
 
Public investment and private investment work on very different principles. It is 
important to reiterate here that public spending is largely directed at providing 
essential collective services and goods – public goods – in which the private sector 
will normally not invest. National defence and street lighting are the usual examples 
that are used, but in the context of the debate here, education, training, transport 
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infrastructure and even welfare provision are important. Public investment, in this 
sense, is focused on long-term investment that complements, rather than crowds-out, 
private investment, providing a basis for economic growth that would not be 
provisioned by the private sector. Private sector investment, on the other hand, is 
ultimately geared towards making profits and returns to shareholders. An important 
point to note here is that, whilst the level of interest rates may play a role in 
investment decisions, the critical factor for private firms is expected returns on capital 
– i.e. anticipated future profits. It follows that the interests of individual firms – in 
making a profit – do not always tally with those of the wider economy. 
 
Recent problems arising from attempts by both Conservative and Labour 
administrations to induce private capital into long term public infrastructure projects 
through public-private partnerships have illustrated this point.  To guarantee private 
sector involvement, the Labour Government has had to construct contracts and forms 
of market relations that offer very favourable returns to investors, whilst reducing the 
share of risk borne by the private sector. The result is often heavily inflated costs to 
the public purse, far beyond what would have been achieved under a more 
conventional public borrowing arrangement. This turns the original argument for 
PPPs on their head; that the private sector bears the risk and the public sector gets the 
benefit (Shaoul, 2005). 
 
What is the relationship between economic growth and public spending? 
 
Measuring economic performance 
 
Alongside claims about ‘crowding out’, the idea is circulating that there is an inverse 
relationship between successful economic development and government intervention 
in the economy. Critics of the public sector claim that those economies performing 
best in the 1990s – an era of increased globalisation and open markets – are those that 
keep taxes low and restrict government spending. Such policies are perceived as the 
only route to economic growth in a context where business investment is increasingly 
mobile, trans-national and able to choose to invest in those economies where taxation 
levels and restrictions on business, (i.e. ‘red tape’) are kept to a minimum. Leaving 
aside the extensive evidence that business is not quite this footloose (see for example 
Hirst and Thompson, 1998; Dicken, 2003),1 the question raised in the recent debate is 
do low tax, low public sector economies outperform those characterised by higher 
public spending and tax rates? 
 
In contesting a recent Fraser of Allander report about the effects of higher taxation on 
economic growth, The Scotsman article states: ‘This has, for years, been disprovable 
by a simple chart plotting countries’ tax burden against their economic growth and 
national wealth’ (Nelson, 2005). However, no such evidence is provided in the article 
beyond some reference to Ireland and Estonia, without any supporting statistics. 
 
If we actually consider the international comparative evidence to back up these 
claims, we find little discernible pattern in the relationship between economic growth 
and levels of public sector involvement in the economy (see Figure 2). The most 
                                                 
1 For example, in his analysis of the top trans-national corporations between 1993 and 1999, Dicken 
found no significant increase in the extent of overseas operations and that the majority of firms remain 
reliant upon and heavily embedded in their domestic economies. 
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recent data for the OECD (i.e. the world’s more advanced economies), shows that 
there is neither a strong negative or positive relationship between rates of economic 
growth (average annual GDP change) and government spending in the economy.  
States with low levels of public expenditure (i.e. under 40 % of GDP) account for the 
two highest performing economies in the OECD (Ireland and Korea) and the two 
lowest (Japan and Switzerland) over the period.2  
 
Figure 2: GDP Growth versus Government Expenditure for OECD countries
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There is also little evidence to back up ‘crowding out’ arguments with regard to data 
on taxation levels, with very low correlation figures for the relationship between GDP 
and total tax receipts or for the levels of highest income tax3. Whilst the data on levels 
of corporation tax provides some support for the ‘minimal state’ thesis, even this does 
not provide unequivocal support.4 In this respect, Ireland is clearly an outlier from the 
rest of the data, whilst the other states with corporation tax rates below 20% (Hungary 
and Iceland) do not perform much above the OECD average. The country ranked 
fourth in terms of low business taxation, Switzerland, has the second worst growth 
rate (after Japan) across the OECD.  
 
As Financial Times columnist MartinWolf, has noted: ‘no link exists between the size 
of government spending and something one could reasonably define as “international 
competitiveness”’. Wolf goes on to argue that ‘What does indeed matter is the 
efficiency with which money is spent… tax levels are only one of many determinants 
of economic performance. Far more important are: the quality of institutions, 
particularly of public administration and the judiciary, the security of property; the 
probity and public spiritedness of politicians; the soundness of money; the quality of 
education, health and infrastructure.’ (Wolf, 2005). Moreover, if we are concerned 
with a broader definition of economic development and exploring other measures of 
                                                 
2 A correlation analysis of the two variables using the OECD data confirms the absence of any 
significant relationship, giving an R² figure of 0.1 (where 1 = strong relationship and 0 = no 
relationship). 
3 The R² figures for total tax receipts and 0.07 and 0.04 
4 An R² figure of 0.3 which though higher than the other figures in indicating a negative relationship is 
still not a strong one, particularly when outliers are taken account of. 
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performance, public sector involvement in the economy has more beneficial effects. If 
we look at the relationship between levels of inequality in a country and the level of 
tax receipts as a proportion of GDP, we find a positive relationship, although, again, 
not a significantly high one. Nevertheless, it does add another layer of complexity to 
debates about the merits of a minimalist state (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: The relationship between 'tax take' and inequality across the OECD countries
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The Celtic Tiger: myths and realities 
 
As noted above, Ireland, with its image as a low business tax haven, is a favourite for 
the critics of big government, especially in Scotland. As our GDP figures illustrate, 
there is no disputing the dramatic turnaround in the Irish economy in recent years. 
Over the period 1994-2004 it was the fastest growing economy in the OECD. 
However, a focus on national government expenditure is only part of the picture. 
Since its entry into the European Union in 1973 Ireland has been a major beneficiary 
of funds from the Common Agricultural Policy, regional development initiatives and 
social cohesion programmes. Since 1973 it has received over €34 billion of net 
investment from the EU (Source: European Commission services). Between 1984 and 
1995 – key transition years - net EU receipts to Ireland were on average worth over 
4% of national GDP. Even in 2003, Ireland was still receiving the highest net receipts 
of all EU countries at €1.5 billion or €391.70 for every Irish person. Including EU 
funding in this way would put the public sector share of GDP roughly on a par with 
the UK for the same period. Thus we would argue that public sector investment, albeit 
at the European scale, has had at least as significant a role in the Irish renaissance as 
entrepreneurialism and a low tax economy.  
 
Behind the rhetoric of the Celtic Tiger are some less appealing characteristics. In 
particular, levels of inequality as measured by the GINI index reveal Ireland to be one 
of the most unequal countries in the OECD. Ireland’s growth miracle has in this sense 
been highly unevenly distributed, both between rich and poor and geographically 
between the cities and outlying regions. Hot spots of development in Dublin, Cork 
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and Galway co-exist with continuing poverty and social dislocation in other parts of 
the country. 
 
The Public Sector and the Scottish Economy 
 
In responding to the analysis produced by Scottish Enterprise on the role of the public 
sector in the Scottish economy, Professor Ashcroft of the Fraser Allander Institute 
outlined three issues conflated by Scottish Enterprise: “the degree of benefit from 
public spending; the relative scale of public activities; and, whether on account of this 
scale there are harmful, or crowding out, effects on private sector activity” (Ashcroft 
2005: 2). 
 
Scottish Enterprise figures did not include imports, indirect taxes and subsidies, nor 
the net income derived from residents who worked outside the area. As such the 
measure it used (GVA) excluded several factors; i.e. external net income for a 
particular area. This is important in relation to Ayrshire because the Scottish 
Enterprise figures included workbase GVA estimates rather than residence based 
ones, which means that the importance of commuting to the Ayrshire economy was 
ignored. Ashcroft suggests that a better means to judge public expenditure is public 
employment, which ranges between 23 % and 32 % across Scottish LEC areas; a 
proportion significantly lower than the claims of three-quarters of the economy. A not 
insignificant point Ashcroft also made was that Scottish Enterprise actually provided 
no evidence that public spending was crowding-out the private sector, although Sir 
John Ward and subsequent commentators implied this consequence. 
 
In Scotland, the level of public spending as a proportion of GDP was around 50 % in 
2003, which is higher than the UK at around 44 %, but below the level of several 
other small-sized European countries with comparable population levels; see Table 1. 
Other countries have lower levels of spend, but the relationship between spending and 
growth is far from clear cut, especially when European Union (EU) subsidies are 
factored into the performance of Ireland. However, since the Scottish public spend 
does not impact upon fiscal policy in Scotland, because it does not affect interest 
rates, and therefore does not bear a direct relationship to overall interpretations of 
economic growth, it is more useful to consider structural features of the Scottish 
economy such as employment.  
 
Table 1: Small European Country Government Spending 
 
COUNTRY GOVERNMENT 
EXPENDITURE 
AS % OF GDP 
(2003) 
POPULATION 
(000) 
AVERGE 
ANNUAL GDP % 
GROWTH 1994-
2004 
Sweden 57.3 8,994 2.8 
Denmark 56.3 5,401 2.1 
Finland 50.7 5,228 3.6 
Norway 50.7 4,592 2.9 
Austria 50.6 8,175 2.1 
Scotland 49.9 5,078 2.2 
Slovakia 49 5,382 4.3 
Switzerland 35.5 7,391 1.3 
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Ireland 34.2 4,044 7.9 
Source: OECD; Scottish data from Scottish National Statistics, Scottish Executive 
(2005) 
 
In his criticism of Ashcroft’s analysis, Nelson (2005) claimed that the public sector 
represented a third of the Scottish workforce. In reality, in 2004 it was actually closer 
to a quarter (23.6 %) according to ONS data; still above the UK average, but nowhere 
near a third. Compared to the rest of the UK, the growth of public sector employment 
lags behind many other regions, including the South East of England. The highest 
growth in proportion of public sector employment between 1999 and 2004 was in 
English regions like the North West (13.3 %), East Midlands (14.33 %), Eastern 
(17.15 %), and South West (12.65 %), rather than in Scotland (10.27 %), which was 
closer to the South East at 10.32 %.  
 
Scottish Executive data suggests that public sector employment is around 28 % of 
total employment, although this data also shows that there have been more significant 
increases in private sector employment across a range of jobs than in the public sector 
and that the public sector share has fallen between 1996 and 2003 from 28.8 % to 27.9 
%. Just as important is the composition of the Scottish workforce, with a declining 
number of jobs in the manufacturing sector where a boom from 1995 to 2000 
subsequently collapsed between 2000 and 2002 (see McLaren 2003). The longer term 
collapse of Scotland’s manufacturing and industrial base – particularly in coalfield 
regions such as Ayrshire – and the failure by either policymakers or Scotland’s 
business sector to create alternative employment is arguably a much greater factor in 
continuing poor economic performance. That the public sector’s share of total 
employment in these areas has risen in recent years is arguably more effect of 
industrial decline and economic underperformance than its cause. 
 
The role of public sector institutions in the knowledge-based economy 
 
At a broader level, there has been a growing recognition in academic and policy 
circles that forms of government intervention are critical for successful regional and 
national economic performance, particularly if growth is to be balanced with a more 
even distribution of wealth. Recent global financial crises and corporate scandals, 
such as the collapse of Enron, have demonstrated the dangers of unregulated 
economic development and trade. In this context, those arguing against ‘Big 
Government’ in Scotland are directing their ire at a ‘straw man’. No serious economic 
commentators are arguing for Soviet style command economies, but there is 
recognition that the state and public sector have an important role to play in economic 
development, particularly if the needs of business are to be balanced against those of 
the wider population and the environment. 
 
Moreover debates about how countries compete in the context of an increasingly 
knowledge intensive economy have identified the important incubator and anchoring 
roles played by public sector institutions in fostering growth in new local clusters 
linked to sectors such as information technology and biotechnology (Rodrigues et al 
2002, Cooke 2002a, Cumbers and MacKinnon 2006).  
 
Researchers stress the importance of the qualitative nature of the relationships 
between state and business, between public sector actors and the private sector in 
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fostering economic growth and more importantly adapting successfully to a 
dramatically changing global economy. Competitive success depends more and more 
upon the harnessing of key knowledge and skills, requiring long term commitments in 
a country’s human and technology resources, which firms with short term profit 
horizons are increasingly unwilling to undertake. Governments need to take a more 
active part in ‘systems of national and regional innovation’ which involve 
intervention in education, training, R&D, labour market regulation and in the 
provision of finance and support for entrepreneurialism and innovation (Cooke 
2002b).  
 
Government investment has been critical in the success of a small country like 
Finland, which has developed a competitive presence in sectors such as IT, 
telecommunications (symbolised by the emergence of Nokia as world leader in 
mobile phones) and biotechnology. Crucially, the Finnish government expanded R&D 
expenditure from 1 to 3 % of GNP between 1980 and 1999 (Schienstock et al 2004). 
Contrast UK government expenditure on science and technology which remained 
static at 0.2% of GDP between 1987 and 2004 (HM Treasury 2005, p.38).  
 
Reflecting the failure of past strategies to improve the competitive position of the 
Scottish economy vis-à-vis other UK and European regions, the Scottish Executive 
has recently recognised the importance of a more strategic role for government in 
facilitating successful economic growth. Scotland’s national economic development 
framework, titled Smart, Successful Scotland, has reflected a qualitative shift in the 
premises of the nation’s economic growth from a strategy emphasising the attraction 
of inward investment on the basis of low-cost advantages, low value added and 
labour-intensive activities, to one which attempts to redress issues of productivity, 
competitiveness and innovation (Scottish Executive, 2001).  
 
Scotland’s emergent biotechnology ‘cluster’ now employs around 8,700 people in 
Edinburgh, just under 4,000 in Glasgow and 3,500 in Dundee (Leibovitz 2004, 
p.1139). The public sector, in various forms, has played an important role in the 
development trajectory of the cluster. In the first place, the country’s science base has 
provided the foundation for biotechnology.  An ESRC Innogen Centre report by 
Alessandro Rosiello (2004) on specific life sciences policies highlights the important 
role that the public sector can play in connecting science and technology in public 
organisations like universities with private sector commercialisation. A critical factor 
is the overall investment in Scottish higher education (and schooling), which is now 
40% more per capita than the rest of the UK. More specifically, Scotland is over-
represented in the UK in terms of its share of university graduates in the life sciences, 
‘producing’ a yearly average of 18 % of the UK’s postgraduates in the these fields 
(Leibovtiz, 2004). 
 
Aside from the education system, key public sector agencies have been important at 
different phases of the cluster’s development. Scottish Enterprise has played an 
important role through interventions ranging from government grants or awards (i.e. 
SMART, SPUR) through to small company support, proof of concept funding and 
investment funds. Furthermore, initiatives taking more localised forms have been 
supported by Scottish Enterprise’s local agencies.  For instance, investment to the 
tune of £1.4 million is expected in order to develop a Centre for Biomedical Research 
in Edinburgh as “a life science knowledge hub” accompanied by other elements of 
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business and physical infrastructure.  A Science Park is also being planned for the 
City of Dundee, while Glasgow’s West of Scotland Science Park is promoted as 
Scotland’ leading location for developing bioscience business (Leibovitz 2004).   
 
But considerable innovation and entrepreneurialism has also stemmed from the public 
sector itself. The example of the Roslin Institute in Edinburgh is illustrative and far 
from unique. The Institute ventured into biotechnology in the early 1980s when it 
shifted its research orientation from farm animal breeding and production to 
technologies which could be used to create ‘transgenic’ animals which produce 
human proteins in their milk.  The lack of interest, at the time, from the big 
pharmaceutical companies in commercialising this area of research led to the 
Institute’s setting of up spin-out company, Pharmaceutical Proteins Ltd (PPL) in 1987 
to take the technology to market.  PPL gained world fame in 1997 when it created 
Dolly the Sheep, the first mammal cloned from an adult cell.  By 2000, PPL 
Therapeutics had established its position as a specialist in the production of 
therapeutic proteins in the milk of transgenic animals, was engaged in collaboration 
with the German pharmaceutical firm Bayer in order to carry a lung disease drug 
through clinical trials, and expanded the potential geography of its operation to 
include the manufacturing and commercialisation of its drugs internationally, research 
and farming facilities in New Zealand and Virginia, and investing in a new 
manufacturing plant near Edinburgh (Cumbers et al 2006). 
 
Conclusion 
 
The example of the biotechnology industry serves to illustrate a much broader point 
about the relationship between public and private sectors in Scotland’s contemporary 
economy. Recent criticisms of the public sector have tended to resort to old and 
largely discredited arguments about ‘crowding out’ which do not reflect the more 
complex ways that public spending interacts with business activity. The evidence that 
we have presented here suggests that there is no clear evidence, either historically, or 
through international comparison, that countries with high levels of public spending 
have a poorer economic performance than those with lower levels. Public spending 
however is important in ensuring that economic wealth is broadly distributed.  
 
The attack on public services in Scotland is particularly misinformed about the 
realities of both the devolution settlement, the way tax and spending processes operate 
between Holyrood and Westminster and as a result of how crowding out would work 
in practice. It has also overestimated the role played by the public sector. Recent 
employment growth has been higher in the private sector, particularly in the services 
sector, whilst manufacturing continues to perform poorly. However, as we have 
noted, no evidence has been presented to make the link between public sector growth 
and poor manufacturing performance. 
 
It is not surprising that business and media commentators rail against the public 
sector. There is nothing new to arguments for low taxation from business and 
corporate lobbyists. From the perspective of an individual businessman or 
entrepreneur, more tax paid to government can mean less finance for investment in a 
firm or business. However, at the aggregate of the economy as a whole, there is little 
evidence that reductions in public expenditure lead to greater business investment. If 
anything, the opposite seems the case. As the IFS has noted, business investment in 
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the UK as a whole continued to lag behind the experience of many competitor 
countries during the later half of the 1990s, despite a drop in government expenditure. 
Meanwhile, as the venerable Observer economics correspondent, William Keegan 
continually reminds us in his column, the UK’s better economic performance than 
much of the rest of the European Union in the first half of the 2000s was due to 
increased public sector investment at a time when private sector investment and 
growth was relatively static. 
 
Nevertheless, levels of public investment and expenditure in Scotland and the UK the 
recent past have still been low by historical standards. Indeed, the evidence from 
countries and regions that are competing successfully in new knowledge economy 
sectors is that greater levels of strategic public investment are required in areas such 
as science and technology, R&D and education to facilitate innovation and 
entrepreneurship. Private sector investment remains low, particularly in 
manufacturing activity, despite numerous policies such as tax credits and reduction in 
corporation tax geared towards stimulating it. In this sense, the policy debate needs to 
move away from the simplistic story that business is ‘good’ and government is ‘bad’ 
to a more informed analysis of how private and public sectors interact in successful 
and balanced economies. 
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